Introduction
Zwicker's Hypergame [Zwi87] is an alternating two-player game: one player chooses any alternating game G which terminates 1 (e.g. "O's & X's" or Chess 2 ), then play proceeds in G. At the Imperial College Games Workshop in 1996, the author illustrated how hypergames -games in which games can be played as moves -can model languages with universal quantification. Originally implemented in [Hug97] for Girard's system F [Gir71, GLT89] , the idea is quite general, and has been successfully applied to affine linear logic [MO01, Mur01] and Curry-style type isomorphisms [dL06] .
Universally quantified games
Recall the little girl Anna-Louise who wins one point out of two in a "simultaneous display" against chess world champions Spassky and Fischer [Con76, Theorem 51] . She faces Spassky as Black and Fischer as White, and copies moves back and forth, indirectly playing one champion against the other. When Spassky opens with the Queen's pawn d4, she opens d4 against Fischer; when Fischer responds with the King's knight Nf6, she responds Nf6 against Spassky, and so on. 
Anna-Louise
We shall write G → G for such a simultaneous display with a game G (so Anna-Louise played the game Chess → Chess above, as second player, against the Fischer-Spassky team). 4 Observing that her copycat strategy is not specific to chess, Anna-Louise declares that she will tackle the Fischer-Spassky team in a more grandiose spectacle: she will give them an additional first move, to decide the game for simultaneous display. For example, the Fischer-Spassky team might choose Chess, thereby opting for the simultaneous display Chess → Chess, and play continues as above. Or The key novelty of [Hug97] was to define this as a formal game, a hypergame or universally quantified game, which we shall write as ∀G . G → G
The tree of ∀G . G → G is illustrated below. Similar in spirit to Zwicker's hypergame 5 , it differs in the fact that the first player not only chooses G but also plays an opening move m in G. We call such a compound move (importing a game, and playing a move in a game) a hypermove. 
∀G . G → G

Self-reference (without paradox)
In the tree above, we have shown two cases for instantiating G in the hypergame H = ∀G . G → G, either to Chess or to O's & X's. But it is also possible to instantiate G to a hypergame, or indeed, to H itself. We consider this case below. The initial state is:
Anna-Louise
Fischer and Spassky begin by importing a game for G, in this case, H = ∀G . G → G itself, yielding a simultaneous display of H:
Fischer Spassky
In other words, we have:
The local bound variable G is renamed in each component to clarify the evolution of the game below. 6 As in the simultaneous display Chess → Chess, where Spassky opened with a move on his chessboard, here in H → H Spassky must complete the opening hypermove by playing a move on his copy of H. Since H = ∀G 2 . G 2 → G 2 is a hypergame, opening H requires importing another game, instantiating G 2 . Suppose he chooses Chess for G 2 :
Anna-Louise 6 The scope of ∀G 1 in the diagram does not extend past the central arrow →. In other words, formally the game played by Anna-Louise is (∀G 1 .
Now Spassky has his own local simultaneous display Chess → Chess. 
Chess , Nf3
Fischer might now open his other board with e4, which Anna-Louise would copy back to the corresponding board against Spassky: We shall write this triple simultaneous display as Chess → Chess → Chess, and more generally, for any game G, as G → G → G.
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Now consider the universally quantified form of this game, the hypergame
As with ∀G . G → G discussed above, the Kasparov-Fischer-Spassky team, KFS, now has the right to choose the game of the triple simultaneous display, as part of their opening (hyper)move. We shall say that Anna-Louise's strategy is uniform in this setting if
• irrespective of the game chosen by KFS, she always ignores the same player, Kasparov or Fischer.
Otherwise her strategy is ad hoc. For example, her strategy would be ad hoc if, when KFS chooses Chess, she ignores Kasparov and copies chess moves between Fischer and Spassky, but when KFS chooses O's & X's, she ignores Fischer and copies X and O moves between Kasparov and Spassky. In this case the geometry of her move copying depends on the game imported by FKS: she is not treating G as a "black box". There are only two uniform strategies for Anna-Louise: either she always copies between Kasparov and Spassky, ignoring Fischer, or she always copies between Fischer and Spassky, ignoring Kasparov. These correspond to the system F terms
where the variable k corresponds to Kasparov and f corresponds to Fischer. More generally, with multiple bound ∀ variables and more complicated game imports, we shall take uniformity to mean that the links Anna-Louise sets up between components (such as the Kasparov ↔ Spassky or Fischer ↔ Spassky links above) must be independent of the games imported by the opposing team: these imported games are impenetrable "black boxes".
Fixed links. Uniformity as independence from the particular games imported by the opposing team will include independence from the not only the identity of those games, but also from their state. This will ensure that the geometry of Anna-Louise's copycat play remains constant over time: once she has committed to linking one component to another, she must stick with that link for the rest of the hypergame. 
Anna-Louise
We shall write Chess × Chess → Chess × Chess for this simultaneous display. 8 Suppose Spassky begins with e4. Anna-Louise, playing copycat, has a choice between copying this move to Fischer or to Kasparov. Suppose she copies it to Fischer, who responds with c5, which she duly copies back to Spassky: 
For example, should Karpov respond with Nf3, she would copy that move across to Fischer, then continue copying between Fischer and Karpov, and between Kasparov and Spassky. She could do this "relinking" for any game G, not just Chess,
no matter what the game G is, she could link the first and third G, and link the second and fourth G, but if a point is reached in which all four copies of G have the same state, she switches the linkage, as in the chess example above. If she consistently does this for all G, she has a strategy on the hypergame ∀G . G × G → G × G which, in some fashion, does not depend on G. Such "relinking" strategies do not correspond to system F terms, and are eliminated from the model by our uniformity condition: independence from G means independence not only from the identity of G, but also from the state of G.
Negative quantifiers
Linear polymorphism was modelled in [Abr97] using a universal notion of the games in [AJ94, AJM00] . Full completeness failed for types with negative quantifiers. In this subsection we illustrate how the hypergames model successfully treats negative quantifiers.
The polarity of a quantifier in a type is positive or negative according to the number of times it is to the left of an arrow (in the syntactic parse tree of the type): positive if even, negative if odd. For example, ∀X is positive in ∀X.T and ∀Y.∀X.T , negative in (∀X.U) → T and (V → ∀X.U) → T , and positive in (∀X.U) → V → T .
Consider the simultaneous display H → H where H is the hypergame ∀G . G → G:
Fischer's quantifier ∀G 1 is negative. 9 To kick off, Spassky must open the game ∀G 2 . G 2 → G 2 in front of him. This is a hypergame, universally quantified, so he must begin by instantiating G 2 . He chooses G 2 = Chess, and opens Nf3 on the board where he has White:
Anna-Louise
We shall consider three of the copycat strategies available to Anna-Louise from this point: 
The notation h U in the third term denotes the application of h to the type U.
The first copycat strategy ι . Anna-Louise opens the hypergame ∀G 1 . 
This copycat strategy ι corresponds to the identity system F term
The same strategy models the η-expanded variant λh
The second copycat strategy σ . The second copycat strategy σ "plays Spassky against himself". Recall the state after Spassky's opening move:
Spassky has just imported Chess and opened with the White move Nf3. In this scenario AnnaLouise copies that move locally, to the other board in front of Spassky:
Spassky may respond with g6 as Black, which Anna-Louise copies back to the other board:
She continues to copy moves along the following copycat link, leaving Fischer to forever twiddle his thumbs:
This copycat strategy corresponds to the system F term 
On the right four boards she continues just as on the four boards of the identity ι. If Fischer responds as Black on the fourth board, she copies this to the last board against Spassky, and if Fischer opens as White on the third board, she copies this to open the other board against Spassky.
On the left two boards she "plays Fischer against himself". If Fischer opens with White on the second board, she copies this to him on the first board; if Fischer responds as Black on the first board, she copies that back to the second board. This corresponds to the first argument λx
associated with this strategy.
Note that all three of the above copycat strategies are uniform: had the imported game been O's & X's instead of Chess, Anna-Louise would have copied the moves around in exactly the same geometry. In the third strategy she would have imported O's & X's → O's & X's for G 1 against Fischer. This strategy always imports K → K against Fischer, whatever the game K imported by Spassky. The geometry of Anna-Louise's six copycat links is independent of K.
Other conceptual ingredients of the model
This subsection may be somewhat abstruse for readers not already familiar with game semantics; consider skipping to Section 2 below, without loss of continuity.
So far in this introduction we have sketched the following ingredients of our model:
• Hypergames: games as moves, to model universal quantification/instantiation.
• Self-reference: hypergames can be imported into hypergames, and a hypergame may even be imported into itself.
• Uniformity: the shape of Anna-Louise's play, in terms of how we copy moves around, cannot depend on the choices of games imported by the opposing team: she must treat those games as "black boxes". Once two (sub)games are linked by copycat, she cannot change that link.
The following additional ingredients come from prior (first-order, unquantified) work:
• Backtracking. We permit moves to be taken back during play, corresponding to the fact that a system F function can call its argument an arbitrary number of times. Backtracking was used by Lorenzen [Lor60, Fel85] for modelling proofs of intuitionistic logic, by Coquand [Coq91, Coq95] , and by Hyland and Ong [HO00].
• Innocence. Following Coquand [Coq91, Coq95] , Hyland-Ong [HO00] and Nickau [Nic96] , strategies depend only on a restricted "view" of the history of play.
• Interaction. We use Coquand-style interaction between backtracking strategies to model normalisation of system F terms, specifically, the refinement by Hyland and Ong of this interaction in a lambda calculus (cartesian closed) setting.
• Liveness. A strategy must always be able to make a move (coined liveness by Conway [Con76] ).
• Copycat condition. We impose (a restriction of) Lorenzen's condition [Lor60] for dialogues listed by Felscher as (D10) [Fel85] , which requires that an atomic formula (or in the present system F context, a type variable) be "asserted" by Anna-Louise only if, within her view, the opposing team has just asserted it.
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These additional ingredients relate to quantifiers:
• Copycat expansion. Technically, uniformity will be implemented by copycat expansion [Hug06] , similar to Felscher's skeleton expansion [Fel85, Fel01] (and equivalent to the condition in [Hug97, Hug00]): whenever a strategy includes a play (accepts a move sequence) p, with a variable X imported by the opponent into a quantified variable, then for all types T , all variants of p obtained by substituting T for X and playing copycat between appropriate instances of T are also in the strategy.
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• Compactness. A strategy is determined by a finite "skeleton", which expresses only the copycat links between components.
The main theorem is that the map from system F terms to strategies (satisfying the above properties) is surjective. A surjectivity theorem of this kind for simply typed λ-calculus is given in [Plo80] , but since [AJ92] such a result in a logical setting has often come to be referred to as full completeness, when it includes a semantic notion of composition.
Modular construction of games
We shall define system F games modularly. First we define a transition system whose states are system F types, and whose transition labels are hypermoves. The hypermoves involve instantiating quantifiers in the states (just as the examples above involved instantiating quantifiers during play). Every transition system determines a forest (disjoint union of trees): its set of non-empty traces. Every forest can be interpreted as an arena, in the sense of Hyland and Ong [HO00] .
Following Hyland and Ong, every arena defines a game, with backtracking. The (hyper)game we associate with a system F type will be such a backtracking arena-game. Since we use arena games, interaction of strategies (composition) is precisely the Hyland-Ong interaction.
The underlying first-order composition allows us to relate the composition to an underlying untyped lambda calculus machine, as in [DHR96] , upon erasing the system F type information. In other words, the composition, when viewed as acting on η-long β-normal forms (representing innocent view functions), corresponds to (a) erasing the system F type information, (b) computing with the abstract machine [DHR96] on the underlying untyped lambda term, then (c) replacing type information. 13 If we erase the type information but stay in the model (i.e., we don't look at the lambda terms), then we are just composing strategies in a naive games model of untyped lambda calculus. The underlying transition system of the untyped lambda game has a single state and every integer i 1 as transition labels. These integer labels are precisely the result of deleting the instatiating types from the transition labels of the system F transition graph. Or to put it another way: the system F transition labels are those of the untyped lambda transition graph together with type instantiations. The untyped lambda calculus games similar to those in [KNO02] .
Related work
Affine linear polymorphism was modelled in [Abr97] 14 with a PER-like "intersections" of first-order games of the form [AJ94, AJM00]. Abramsky and Lenisa have explored systematic ways of modelling quantifiers so that, in the limited case in which all quantifiers are outermost (so in particular positive), models are fully complete [AL00] . (See subsection 1.4 for a simple example of a type at which full completeness fails.)
The hypergame/uniformity technique presented here has been applied to affline linear logic [MO01, Mur01] , and has been used to study Curry-style type isomorphisms [dL06] .
Transition system games and backtracking
A game such as Chess or O's & X's has a state (the configuration of the board or grid) and, for every state, a set of transitions or moves (e.g. Nf3, Bb4, X top-right, O centre), each with an ensuing state.
15 Such a game can be specified as a deterministic labelled transition system: an edge-labelled directed graph whose vertices are the states of the game, with a distinguished initial state. A fragment of the transition system for chess is illustrated below. Note that the graph is not a tree. Without a distinguished initial state, we shall refer to such a graph as a transition graph. Formally, a transition graph (Q, M, ) comprises a set Q of states, a set L of labels, and a partial transition function : Q × L ⇀ Q. 17 We write q l q ′ for (q, l) = q ′ . A transition system (Q, L, , ⋆) is a transition graph (Q, L, ) together with an initial state ⋆ ∈ Q. A trace of (Q, L, , ⋆) is a finite sequence l 1 . . . l k of labels l i ∈ L (k 0) such that
18 For example, d4 Nf6 c4 is a trace of chess, visible in the diagram above.
Games
Let M be a set of moves. A trace over M or M-trace is a list (finite sequence) m 1 . . . m k of moves m i ∈ M (k 0). A set G of M-traces is a tree if whenever m 1 . . . m k is in G with k 1 then its predecessor m 1 . . . m k−1 is also in G, and the empty trace ε is in G (the root of the tree). A game over M or M-game is a tree of M-traces. Following [HO00], we write O for the first player (associated with odd moves, i.e., moves in a trace with odd index), and P for the second player (associated with even moves).
Every transition system ∆ with label set M defines a game G(∆) over M, namely the set of traces of ∆. For example, if ∆ N is the chess transition system depicted above, and M N is the set of all chess moves {Ne5, Qa2, Kh1, . . .}, then G(∆ N ) (the set of all traces of the chess transition system) is a game over M N . This game comprises all legal sequences of chess moves.
Strategies
A strategy (implicitly for the second player P) for a game G is a tree σ ⊆ G whose every odd-length trace has a unique one-move extension in σ: if m 1 . . . m k ∈ σ and k is odd, there exists a unique move m such that m 1 . . . m k m ∈ σ. A strategy σ for G is live (or total) if it responds to every stimulus: if m 1 . . . m k ∈ σ with k even and m 1 . . . m k m ∈ G, then m 1 . . . m k m ∈ σ. 
Backtracking
When playing chess against a computer, there is usually an option to take a move back. If we allow both players (user and computer) to take back moves, and also to return to previously abandoned lines, we obtain a derived game in which a move is either an opening chess move (starting or restarting the game) or is a pair: a pointer to an earlier move by the opponent, and a chess move in response to that move. For example, here is a trace of backtracking chess, with time running left-to-right (so backtracking pointers are right-to-left):
The penultimate move e3, with no backtracking pointer, is a restarting move. Since this is a trace of a game with an underlying transition system, we can include the states in the depiction, as below, which corresponds to the first six moves above. 
Nc6
In this depiction we draw the pointers akin to transitions in the underlying transition system, with their labels. This clarifies the sense in which we refer back to a previous state during backtracking, and make our move from there. We shall write G for the backtracking variant of a game G, formalised below. Let M be a set of moves. A dialogue over M is a an M-trace in which each element may carry an odd length pointer 1, e5 2, Nf3 1, c5 2, f4 3, Nc6 6, Bb5 3, Nf6 0, e3 7, a6 A move of the form 0, m , without a pointer, is a starting move. A thread of a dialogue over M is any sequence of elements traversed from a starting move by following pointers towards the right. For example, e4 e5 Nf3 Nc6 Bb5 is a thread of the chess dialogue above:
The singleton sequence e3 is also a thread, as is e4 e5 f4 .
Let G be an M-game. A dialogue over M respects G if its threads are in G. For example, if Chess abbreviates our earlier formalisation G(∆ N ) of the game of chess as a transition system game, then the dialogue over M N depicted above respects Chess (since every thread is a legal sequence of chess moves from the initial chess position). The backtracking game G is the set of all dialogues over M which respect G. For example, the dialogue over M Chess depicted above is a trace of Chess, i.e., of "backtracking chess".
The P-backtracking game G P is obtained from G by permitting only the second player P to backtrack: every O-move (move in odd position) but the first points to the previous move. Formally,
For every type T of system F, we shall define a transition system ∆ T and define the hypergame associated with T simply as the backtracking game over this transition system, i.e., G(∆ T ). For didactic purposes, we begin in the next section with the restricted case of lambda calculus.
Lambda calculus games
Let λ λ λ denote the types of λ calculus generated from a single base type X by implication →. Every λ λ λ type T determines a transition system ∆ T :
20 N = {0, 1, 2, . . .}.
• States are λ λ λ types, with an additional initial state ⋆ .
• A label is any i ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . .}, called a branch choice.
• Transitions. A 1-labelled transition ⋆ 1 T from the initial state to T , and transitions
for 1 j n.
For example, if U = X → (X → X) → X then the reachable portion of the transition system ∆ U is
so the associated (non-backtracking) game (set of traces) G(∆ U ) is {ε, 1, 11, 12, 121}, where ε denotes the empty sequence.
THEOREM 1 Let T be a lambda calculus type generated from a single base type X by implication →. The η-expanded β-normal terms of type T are in bijection with finite live strategies on the
Proof. A routine induction: a restriction of the definability proof in [Hug97] , in turn a variant of the definability proof in [HO00] .
The η-expanded β-normal forms t n of U = X → (X → X) → X (whose transition system was depicted above) are
for n 0 and the unique maximal trace of the corresponding live finite strategy τ n on G(∆ T )
with n occurrences of 2. Below we depict this dialogue in the case n = 2 (corresponding to the term λx X . λf X→X . f(f x)) with its states (as we did for the chess dialogue on page 21). It is easier to display with time running down the page, rather than from right to left. 21 f n denotes n applications of f: f 0 (x) = x and f n (x) = f(f n−1 (x)) for n 1.
This notation highlights the similarity with Lorenzen's dialogues [Lor60, Fel85] . What we show as states, he referred to as assertions.
The copycat condition
In this section we introduce the copycat condition [Hug97] on strategies, which is crucial for uniformity (more precisely, for us to be able to implement uniformity via copycat expansion later). This condition a slight restriction of a condition of Lorenzen for dialogue games (listed as condition (D10) in [Fel85] ). We shall introduce the condition in the context of lambda calculus games; the generalisation to system F games in the sequel is immediate. Extend the set λ λ λ of lambda calculus types from the previous subsection to those generated by implication → from the ambient set Var of system F type variables. The transition system ∆ T associated with a λ λ λ type T is defined exactly as in the previous section, but now in the transitions
X may be any type variable in Var.
The colour of a transition
is the rightmost variable Y in the target. The colour of a move in a trace of G(∆ T ) or a dialogue in G(∆ T ) is the colour of the associated transition. A dialogue in the P-backtracking game G(∆ T ) P satisfies the copycat condition if the colour of every P-move (even-index move) is equal to the colour of the preceding O-move. 22 A strategy satisfies the copycat condition if each of its traces satisfies the copycat condition.
As a simple illustration of the copycat condition, consider the type
whose transition system ∆ U is below (only reachable states shown).
The colour of the top and lower-left transitions is X, and the colour of the lower-right transition is Y. The associated (non-backtracking) game (set of traces) G(∆ U ) is {ε, 1, 2, 11, 12}. There are two live strategies in the P-backtracking game G(∆ U ) P , whose maximal traces are as follows, with the colour of each move shown beneath it in brackets:
The first strategy satisfies the copycat condition, while the second does not. The strategies correspond (respectively) to the terms
of which only the former is typed correctly as X → Y → X. The second attempts to return y of type Y, while the rightmost variable of X → Y → X is X. This corresponds to the failure of the copycat condition for the second strategy.
The following is a corollary of the theorem above.
THEOREM 2 Let T be a lambda calculus type generated from the set Var of system F type variables by implication →. The η-expanded β-normal terms of type T are in bijection with finite live strategies on the P-backtracking game G(∆ T ) P which satisfy the copycat condition.
Remarks on Hyland-Ong arenas
This section is for readers familiar with Hyland-Ong games [HO00] . It can be skipped without loss of continuity.
The set of non-empty traces of a transition system forms a forest under the prefix order, and is therefore an arena in the sense of Hyland and Ong [HO00] . Write A(∆) for the arena of a transition system ∆, and for a lambda calculus type T abbreviate A(∆(T )) to A(T ). The following arena isomorphism is immediate:
where ⇒ is the Hyland-Ong function space operation on arenas and ∼ = is isomorphism of forests. Elements of these arenas are sequences (traces), and therefore Hyland-Ong dialogues in them suffer some redundancy, as in (for example) 
eliminating the redundancy. This is how we have opted to formalise the backtracking games over transition systems in the previous subsections. Note, however, this notational difference is trivial, and in spirit they are essentially Hyland-Ong arena/dialogue games. The notation is simply taylored towards arenas whose forests are described as sets of traces, rather than partial-order forests as used originally by Hyland and Ong [HO00] . Since our games are Hyland-Ong games, and we have the isomorphism relating syntactic → with arena ⇒ above, we obtain composition (hence a category) as standard Hyland-Ong composition of innocent strategies.
In the next section we extend the lambda calculus transition systems to system F transition systems. The following arena (forest) ismorphisms will then hold:
The arena-product (disjoint union of forests) is taken over all system F types. Composition in our system F model is simply Hyland-Ong composition.
System F games (hypergames)
We extend the lambda calculus transition systems defined above to all of system F. States will be types, as before, and a transition will remain a branch choice i 1, but now together with some types to instantiate quantifiers. We begin by precisely defining quantifier instantiation.
Recall that a prenex type is a type in which all quantifiers have been pulled to the front by exhaustively applying the rewrite T → ∀X.U ∀X . T → U throughout the type. 23 Thus a type is prenex if and only if it has the form
for prenex types T i and type variables X and X j . Write T [V/X] for the result of substituting the type V for the free variable X throughout the prenex type T , and (if necessary) converting to prenex form. For example
called the result of importing V into ∀X.T . For example,
A prenex type is resolved if it has no outermost quantifier, i.e., it has the form
a form which we shall often abbreviate to
For example, we saw above that
Define the transition system ∆ T of a prenex type T as follows:
• States are resolved prenex types, with an additional initial state ⋆ .
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• A label is a pair i, V 1 . . . V k where i 1 is a branch choice, k 0 and each V i is a type, called an import.
whenever 1 i n and
(Thus a transition chooses a branch T i and resolves it to form the next state.) 23 Without loss of generality, in the rewrite assume X is not free in T . 24 Prenex types were drawn graphically in [Hug97, Hug00] , in a manner akin to Böhm trees, and called polymorphic arenas.
More generally, the transition system of a type is the transition system of its prenex form.
An example transition is shown below.
The branch choice 2 selects the branch ∀X.X → X and the imports ∀Y.Y and Z 1 → Z 2 → Z resolve this branch to form the next state. 
Implicit prenexification
Prenexification is a lynchpin of the hypergames approach [Hug97] : it is critical to the dynamics of hypergames that in a type T → ∀X.U the quantifier ∀X is available for instantiation. Whether we make the prenexifications T → ∀X.U ∀X.T → U explicit during play or not is optional. We can just as well leave prenexification implicit, by formally designating ∀X as available for instantiation in T → ∀X.U .
A quantifier ∀X in a type T is available if T has any of the following forms:
For example, ∀X and ∀Y are available in ∀Y.(∀Z.Y → Z) → ∀X.X, but ∀Z is not.
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Type resolution and importation are tweaked in the obvious way, as follows. A type is resolved if it has no available quantifier, i.e., if it has the form
for n 0 and types T i , called branches. (All we have done is drop the requirement that the T i be prenex.) Let ∀X be the leftmost available quantifier in a type T , and let T X be the result of deleting
the result of importing a type V into T , and define iterated importation T · V 1 . . . V n as before.
The (lazy style) transition system ∆ T of a system F type remains essentially unchanged:
• States are system F types, with an additional initial state ⋆ .
• A label is a pair i, V 1 . . . V k where i 1 is a branch choice, k 0 and each V i is a type, called an import. 25 To obtain a category with products, we extend system F with products, and allow import/resolution/substition with products. 26 We assume without loss of generality throughout this section that all bound variables are distinct from one another and from the free variables. 27 Note that ∀X is available in T iff it is one of the outermost quantifiers in the prenex form T of T (i.e., T = ∀X 1 . . . ∀X k .U and X is among the X i ). In this sense, prenexification is implicit, or "lazy": from a behavioural point of view, we're still working with prenex types.
• Transitions. A 1-labelled transition The copycat condition extends from the lambda calculus case to system F in the obvious way: the colour of a transition is once again the rightmost variable of the target.
THEOREM 3 The η-expanded β-normal terms of a closed system F type T are in bijection with finite live strategies on the black box game G(∆ T ) B which satisfy the copycat condition.
Proof. The definability proof in [Hug97] .
Uniformity by copycat expansion
The black box game is highly unsymmetric:
(1) P can backtrack, while O cannot.
(2) P is subject to the copycat condition, while O is not.
(3) O can only import black boxes (free variables); P can import arbitrary types, so long as their free variables are prior black boxes.
To compose strategies we must symmetrise the game, so that O and P can interact. A symmetrisation of backtracking (1) was obtained by Coquand [Coq91, Coq95] . A shared history of two asymmetric strategies is built, in which both players backtrack. Each time either asymmetric strategy plays a move, it can only see a projection of the shared history in which the opposing player does not backtrack. This interaction was made lambda-calculus specific by HylandOng [HO00] , who called the projections views and called the symmetrised strategies innocent.
Symmetrising the copycat condition (2) will be automatic, coming as a simple side effect of the views: we simply demand that, in their respective views, both strategies adhere to the copycat condition.
We shall symmetrise with respect to black boxes (3) via the notion of copycat expansion [Hug06] recalled below.
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Symmetrising (1) yields interaction for lambda calculus over a single base type symbol. Symmetrising (1) & (2) yields interaction for lambda calculus over a set of base type symbols. Symmetrising (1)-(3) yields interaction for system F. We shall refer to the copycat condition together with copycat expansion as uniformity. A visual summary of the symmetrisation is below, where T is a system F type.
uniformity innocence
An arrow here indicates how a strategy on the left lifts to a strategy on the right.
Symmetrising black boxes via copycat expansion
Let T be a closed system F type and d a dialogue in the P-backtracking game G(∆ T ) P which satisfies the copycat condition. Let X be a black box in d, let U be a type, and define d[U/X] as the result of substituting U for free occurrences of X in the imports of d.
To be continued. . .
